Influence of Corporate Control and Ownership Structure on the Value of Firms Listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange by Onguka, David et al.
European Scientific Journal December 2018 edition Vol.14, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
230 
Influence of Corporate Control and Ownership 






PhD Student, School of Business,  
Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Nairobi, Kenya, 
Professor Eramus S. Kaijage 
Dr. Cyrus M. Iraya 
Dr. Sifunjo E. Kisaka 
Lecturers, School of Business,  
Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Doi:10.19044/esj.2018.v14n34p230   URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2018.v14n34p230 
 
Abstract 
This study aimed at establishing the influence of corporate control and 
ownership structure on corporate values of companies listed at the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange. The paper tested the hypothesis that there is no 
significant moderating impact of ownership structure on the relationship 
between corporate control and corporate value growth based on Tobin Q and 
ROA measurements.  The theory applied were agency theory, stewardship 
theory and stakeholder theory with the main anchoring theory being the 
agency theory. The study applied census survey for sixty four firms listed at 
the NSE. The time frame of analysis is five years between 2013 and 2017. Out 
of the 64 listed companies targeted, 58 were analyzed forming 90% of the 
population. The study applied census survey given that the population of the 
listed companies at the NSE were not many. Out of the 64 listed companies 
targeted, 59 were analyzed forming 92% of the population. Corporate control 
index was developed as a proxy for corporate control and ownership structure 
index was developed as a proxy for ownership structure. While ROA and 
Tobin Q were used to measure corporate value. The hypotheses were tested 
using both correlation and regression analysis. The key study variables of the 
listed companies were subjected to descriptive statistics and the results 
revealed a significant positive relationship between the variables. The study 
findings revealed significant moderating effect on the relationship between the 
value of the firm and its ownership structure.  
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Introduction 
 The topic of corporate control has attracted a great interest of scholars, 
regulators and society in general. The motivation of this study is to determine 
the cause of corporate underperformance which continue to be experienced 
globally, regionally and even locally despite institution of regulatory bodies 
and how this is influenced by corporate control and ownership structure. A 
number of studies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Stulz, 1990 and Solomon et al. 
2013) have attributed this problem to separation of ownership and control 
resulting in divergent of concern between agents and principles which results 
in agency cost. 
 According to Berle and Means (1932), as the gap between possession 
and control continue to increase with increasing large organizations and 
decrease in equity ownership, agency cost also increases. This development 
provide a favorable environment for managers to pursue their own interest 
rather than that of the shareholders which indicates the presence of unhealthy 
association problems arising as a result of agency conflict (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The agency costs result from management consuming 
perquisites, suboptimal investments and general inefficiency. Corporate 
control practices improves company’s efficiency and effectiveness through 
proper supervision and governance thereby mitigating on agency costs in an 
effort to bring into line the interest of company managers with that of owners 
in optimizing corporate value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, according 
to Barclay and Holderness (1991) when the desire to obtain private benefit of 
control overrules the incentive effect, managerial owners can reduce corporate 
value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that there is no relationship between 
having managers as owners or part owners and corporate value given that the 
ownership structure is a compromise based on management view of how to 
optimize the performance of the company using an optimal mix of debt and 
equity. 
The structure of ownership is important in the link between corporate 
control and company’s value as the owners’ objective is to maximize their 
returns by strengthening control issues.  According to Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) ownership structure of a company can be endogenously determined by 
its contracting environment such as whether there are high chances of 
perquisite consumption or not and whether the capital structure imposes 
adequate pressure on management to increase company’s value. Jensen (1986) 
suggested corporate governance, corporate financial policies and ownership 
structure as some of the possible mechanism for mitigating agency conflicts 
resulting from widely dispersed share ownership and weak controls. Agency 
theory analyses the contribution of corporate control and ownership structure 
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in reducing agency costs and conflict and how this eventually translates into 
improvement in corporate value and sustenance. Stewardship theory holds that 
conflict of interest between management and owners is none existent and that 
the aim of corporate control is to identify the mechanism for most efficient 
coordination between the two, to enable them optimize capital structure and 
ownership that maximizes shareholders value.  
 
Corporate Control 
The fundamental understanding in the field of corporate control has its 
basis on the fact that there is a potential problem originating from the agency 
conflict which is necessitated by the growth in size and complexities of 
corporation (Denis, 2001). According to Ashbaugh et al. (2004) the 
management and the board have been tasked with the pursuit of impactful 
corporate control which is of great importance to the society as a whole since 
it improves the utilization of resources. Therefore resources will always flow 
to where it is effectively and efficiently utilized and managers who fail to do 
this are eventually replaced or the business collapses. The underperformance 
leading to collapse of significant corporations like WorldCom and Enron 
among others underscores the importance of good corporate control (OECD, 
2004). A standardized structured corporate control index (CCI) was made as 
a proxy for corporate control and relied on intentional surveys got from 
secondary statistics. The index values range was between 0 and 100 where the 
high the score, the better the company is governed. 
Corporate Control mechanism can be classified as internal or external. 
Internal control mechanism refer to the extent to which the mechanism 
influence the systems and procedures adopted by the corporation and generally 
includes board sizes, board remuneration, board independence, top 
management compensation, financial policy, frequency of board meetings, 
CEO duality and ownership concentration (Dalton & Daily, 1992). The 
external control mechanism refers to the extent to which forces outside of the 
corporation exert influence and control over the corporation value creation. 
Their focus is to protect the interest of the shareholders, these includes major 
Institutional shareholders, Government and other regulatory agencies and 
financiers (Dominic & Member, 2015). 
 
Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is the base of corporate management, company 
owners are those who own the privileges to control the company and the right 
to distribute the company’s profits or remaining income (Hansmann, 2000). 
The structure of ownership can be viewed in two ways: ownership 
concentration and ownership mix (Gursoy & Aydogen, 2002). The former is 
about the share of the significant owner and is affected by complete risk and 
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monitoring expenses (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). On the other hand the 
latter is about the characteristics of the significant stakeholder. Lee (2008) 
referred to this division as concentration and mix of ownership. According to 
the theory, concentrated ownership is expected to mitigate the agency problem 
as it provide a mechanism and framework of enhancing corporate control. 
Ownership mix also plays a crucial role in value creation and therefore 
was considered along with state and foreign owners. Depending on the 
appropriateness of board structure, ownership structure and corporate 
financial policies have been suggested as potential mechanisms to control for 
agency problem arising from dispersed ownership (Jensen, 1986). Agency 
problems can be aggravated by high voting rights which may result in pyramid 
ownership structures and crossholding. The resulting situation often results in 
over-reliance on debt resulting from main shareholders desire to preserve their 
shareholding from dilution. Claessens et al. (2002) referred to this 
phenomenon as non-dilution entrenchment. 
 
Firm value 
Eyenubo, (2013) defined firm value as the extent to which the 
objectives of the company have been realized within a given time period. 
According to Black et al. (2006) strengthening corporate control ensures that 
the management will be more aggressive in sourcing for and investing in 
projects with high returns, optimize resources available to achieve this, as well 
as in being more creative in evaluating alternative investments. Corporate 
value or the firm performance over the period was calculated based on asset 
returns (ROA) and Tobin’s Q which, unlike asset returns, combines both 
accounting and markets elements in its measurement criteria. It measures how 
efficient and effective management is in employing company resources to 
generate corporate value (Kiruri, 2013) 
 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange 
Nairobi Securities Exchange is the regulatory body in Kenya, charged 
mainly with ensuring compliance to corporate control and governance 
principles. Some of the regulations to be adhered to by the listed firms are 
intended to eliminate weaknesses identified by previous studies and to 
strengthen and promote effective corporate control for optimal corporate 
performance. Laws have been instituted to guide and enforce governance 
structures, reporting and compliance for the listed firms some of which include 
the companies Act and the CMA act (Mwangi et al., 2014). Despite these 
measures some of companies listed at the NSE continue to show fundamental 
weakness and poor performance. A few of them have collapsed while some 
are in the brink of failures (Omondi & Muturi, 2013). Some of the recent 
failures were Imperial Bank, Dubai bank and Chase bank. Other weaknesses 
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noted are the continuing poor performance shown by Kenya Airways, Uchimi 
Supermarket among others, that have eroded, to some extent, the public 
confidence in its ability to regulate the corporations resulting in increased 
capital flight, weak capital formation and poor economic performance. 
Argument on whether it is the control failure, financial distress or nature of 
the ownership or combination of these that is responsible for the failure 
continues. It is with this background that we intend to establish the influence 
of corporate control on company value as moderated by ownership structure. 
 
Research Problem 
There is an urgent need to determine the loss of confidence in the 
capital market by current and potential investors, the insolvency of a number 
of large corporations in Kenya, regionally and worldwide and reason for 
persistent agency problem. Some of these problems have been linked to the 
division of ownership and controls as corporations grow larger and more 
complex forcing owners to use the services of professional who have the 
capacity to manage such complex set up. Berle and Means (1932) findings 
narrowed down this problem to agency costs. Agency problem arises due to 
differences in interest of shareholders and managers. Some of the high profile 
failures are Air Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe, J.P Morgan, Fredie Mac and Lahmen 
Brothers and worldcom in USA and Europe. According to Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003, such failures points to ineffectiveness or failure of corporate 
control system resulting in fraudulent activities and inefficiencies.  
Despite the substantial evidence of positive influence of corporate 
control, there seems to be a deep rooted problems in some corporate 
governance systems and quality of corporate reporting (Chagbadari, 2011). 
Investors have questioned the effectiveness of current control mechanism put 
in place and are hesitant to commit without clear evidence that correct action 
has been taken and the stock market can be depended upon to generate wealth 
without interference, suboptimal activities of management and inbuilt 
inefficiencies. The insolvency of previously respected corporations due to 
misappropriation and pursuit of personal interest by some management has 
awaken discussion on the importance of control and ownership structure on 
firm performance. The predominant of sub-optimal practice done by the 
executive team intended to gain financial advantage at the expense of owners’ 
results in corporate under-performance. Although corporate control principles 
and institutions tasks with corporate governance have achieved a significant 
improvement in corporate stability and performance, there is still need for 
concrete action on the areas of limitation in depth and understanding of all key 
variables affecting corporate performance and their inter-relations. 
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Research Objective 
To establish the direct influence of corporate control on corporate 
value growth and the impact of ownership on the relationship between 




The agency theory is the anchoring theory in the research as it 
highlights the agency costs arising from the continuing divide of firm 
ownership from control. It provide for corporate control rules and regulations 
that ensure that the board takes its actions in line with owners expectation of 
optimizing returns and value to maximize company’s growth. It also allows 
for the capital structure to be used to alleviate agency costs by aligning further 
the shareholders and management interest through increased pressure to 
perform on the agents. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified certain 
assumptions of agency theory, the key of which are uncertainty and imperfect 
monitoring. The principal experiences uncertainty in his inability to establish 
the return on investment or the maximization of shareholder’s wealth. He is 
also not able to perfectly monitor the activities of the agent. There is also 
information asymmetry resulting from distorted flow of information between 
the principal and the agent. Divergent of interest also results in conflict in the 
relationship as both agent and principal are utility maximizes.  
Critics of the theory points out that it focuses on the divergent 
relationship alone thereby overlooking the divergence of relationships 
between various actors and their inter-dependencies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). These actors are likely to be unique and have symbiotic relationship 
that may not be easily mapped to such divergent stand of the theory. Not all 
agents are opportunistic and self-centred as there are some who was act as true 




Donaldson and Davis (1994) pioneered Stewardship theory. This is a 
relationship based on trust which is developed as an alternative to agency 
theory. The theory argues that human beings are by nature social being and 
therefore have a converging interest as their needs are interrelated, meaning 
that both management and shareholders are interested, deep down, in 
optimizing company value. The theory considers convergence of goals 
amongst parties involved as opposed to just the agent’s self-interest. It holds 
that the only aim of corporate control is to identify the mechanism and 
structures that aid the most efficient coordination amongst owners and 
management which would enable them to optimize on capital structure and 
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ownership structure that maximizes shareholders value and that owners and 
company executive work in harmony always with one similar objectives. 
According to Olson (2008), it was developed so that executive managers of a 




This theory supports the concept of corporate control in a more robust 
way than agency theory and is therefore seen as an advancement of this theory. 
This theory was advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to take into account 
not only the interest of the shareholders but also the interest of all those who 
affect or are affected by the corporation. The stakeholders include employees, 
customers, suppliers, banks, local community and shareholders. The managers 
have therefore the additional responsibility of ensuring that no stakeholder is 
dissatisfied in one way or the other. According to Sternberg (1997), it is a 
doctrine that the corporation should be run not only for the financial and 
corporate value growth benefit of the shareholders but for the benefit of all 
concerned parties. 
 
Corporate Control, Ownership Structure and Company Value 
Empirical evidence shows that several studies have found a positive 
link between corporate control, ownership structure and company value. 
However, this linkage cannot be complete without looking at the moderating 
impact of ownership structure. Wanjugu et al. (2015), studied the effect of 
ownership structure and corporate governance on profitability and market 
value of privatized companies in Kenya. Regression model with a robust 
standard error alternative was applied. The result indicated that government 
ownership and board composition have a positive impact on ROA and Tobin’s 
Q, while women directors have negative impact. The research focused only on 
privatized former government owned or controlled companies but failed to do 
a comprehensive research of all companies listed at the NSE. 
Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) studied the structure of company 
ownerships and its returns of listed companies in Israel. They engaged the 
DEA method of analysis. They finding showed that when companies are run 
by owners or relatives, they are less efficient and achieve poorer performance 
than when managed by professionals. The study considered ownership 
structure as the independent variable in relations to Firm performance with no 
intervening or moderating variables. This study has considered ownership 
structure as a moderating variable. 
M’Ithiria and Musyoki (2014) conducted a research on corporate 
governance, ownership structure perspective and company value. Critically 
reviewed both theoretical and empirical literature. Their conclusion was that 
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that empirical results found so far are mixed, meaning that there is no definite 
evidence of the impact of corporate governance on company value based on 
ownership structure. They failed to consider the intervening effect of capital 
structure on company value. Okiro, Aduda and Omoro (2015) examined 
influence of corporate governance and capital structure on value of companies 
listed at the EAC Securities Exchange. They used descriptive cross-sectional 
design. Their findings indicated a positive link between corporate governance 
and company value. They also found that there is a significant intervening 
impact of capital structure on the link between corporate governance and 
company value which is also positive. The two studies did not consider the 
moderating impact of ownership structure on the link between corporate 
governance and ownership structure.  
 
The Conceptual framework 
The effect of the causation variable over response variable is not only 
direct but also through a moderating variable (ownership structure). This 
moderating variable role has been shown by H2.  The moderating variable of 
ownership structure as measured by ownership concentration, foreign 
ownership and state ownership and is expected to affect company value by 
reducing agency cost and forcing management to invest only in positive return 
project, consume less perquisites and increase efficiency. The direct 
relationship between corporate control and firm performance is shown by H1. 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Model 
 
Source: Author (2018) 
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Data Collection 
This research employed secondary data acquired from past financial 
statements after examining them, an index was formed for corporate control. 
For firm performance, the fiscal statement was analyzed to find ROA and 
Tobin Q. Secondary Data was obtained from companies’ websites, financial 
statements and other records filed with NSE. Where necessary data could not 
be obtained from third parties and websites, the same were requested directly 
from the company’s management. The period of research covered 2013 to 
2017. 
The study applied a corporate control index based on data from several 
authorities including the NSE exchange and others like OECD, CACG. The 
CCI were structured and developed to represent corporate control bifurcated 
into 43 objective aligned questions derived from the collected data obtained 
from secondary sources. CCI were assigned between of 0 to 100 values. 
According to Brown and Caylor, (2004) better governed firms are expected to 
have higher values.  
A structured ownership index (OSI) was developed from data obtained 
from secondary sources including NSE and others like OECD, CACG. The 
OSI was constructed as a proxy for ownership structure of the listed companies 
and these were captured into 24 objective linked questionnaires from the 
above data. A similar index was used by LaPorta et al., (2002). 
 
Data Analysis 
A multivariate regression model was applied to determine the link 
between corporate control and company’s Value. The first hypothesis was 
tested based on the equation below: 
Yit = α + β1CCit + εit-----------------------------------------------------------------(1) 
Where Y represents corporate value or firm performance (ROA 
&Tobin Q), α is the intercept, β1 is regression coefficient, CC is the corporate 
control composite (Measured by Corporate Control Index (CCI)), ε is a 
random error term, i is the companies count and t is the duration of the 
research. 
The approach proposed by Fairchild and Mackinnon (2009), for testing 
moderation was applied. It entailed moderation of the impact of Ownership 
Structure (OS) on the link between Corporate Control (CC) and company’s 
value (Y). The equation is stated below: 
Yit= α + β1CCit + β2OSit + β3CCOSit+ εi-----------------------------------------(2) 
The representation: α is the constant, OS – is the composite of 
Ownership Structure variables (Measured by Ownership Structure Index 
(OSI) β1 is the coefficient of the causation variable, β2 is the coefficient of the 
moderating variable, β3 is the coefficient of the moderating variable impact. If 
β3 and zero varies, moderation impact of the OS -Y relationship is significant. 
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Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics refer to measurement of data in terms of 
minimum, maximum, mean, standard error of estimates. It also include 
measures of symmetry – skewness and flatness or sharpness of data – kurtosis. 
Mean is the average of all numbers and it is a measure of central tendency 
including mode, median and range. The extent to which the regression line 
prediction is corrected is tested by the standard error. Skewness measures the 
probability based on the tails relative sizes. Kurtosis determines, in reference 
to normal distribution, the degree of heaviness or lightness of tailed data. It is 
a measure of combined size of the two tails. 
The study looked at measures of corporate control such as corporate 
ethics, transparency, disclosure and auditing, board remuneration, board 
diversity, board structure and composition among companies listed at the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange as shown below.
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Ownership Structure 
Test on ownership structure 
 
Table 1. Ownership Structure 
 N Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Probability 
Presence of outside blockholders 
(more than 10%) 
58 0.794 0.955 0.352 0.4326 0.265 2.315 3.302 0.0794 
The CEO own shares 58 0.945 0.914 0.331 0.3651 0.756 3.015 12.987 0.0011 
Directors ownership other than 
the CEO and Chairman 
58 0.699 0.865 0.579 0.415 0.875 3.455 16.578 0.0061 
Chairman or CEO is block 
holder (10%) 
58 0.722 0.897 0.763 0.341 0.514 2.401 10.391 0.0027 
Concentration of ownership (top 
five) 
58 0.756 0.921 0.406 0.335 0.032 3.491 3.661 0.0795 
Dividend Policy 58 0.675 0.731 0.309 0.3254 0.731 3.431 8.521 0.0041 
Other staff benefits disclosure 58 0.755 0.794 0.639 0.521 0.784 2.484 8.973 0.0026 
Disclosure of CS report 58 0.705 0.864 0.886 0.5404 0.678 3.451 8.521 0.0015 
Average Score 58 0.75638 0.86763 0.53313 0.40944 0.57938 3.00538 9.11675 0.02213 
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The findings as tabulated above shows an overall average mean of 
0.75638 for ownership structure which is a significant impact on corporate 
value. The presence of outside block-holders with over 10% shareholding has 
an average mean of 0.945 of 0.4326. Cases where CEO also owns shares of 
the listed firms averaged 0.945 with a standard deviation of 0.3651. Directors’ 
ownership other than CEO and Chairman Mean was 0.699 and a standard 
deviation of 0.415. Cases where either chairman or the CEO where the block 
holders with 10% or more of shareholding mean was 0.722 and standard 
deviation of 0.341. Concentration of ownership in the top 5% of the 
shareholding mean was 0.756 and standard deviation of 0.335 while listed 
corporations with dividend policy results into a mean of 0.675 and a α of 
0.3254. Listed firms which disclosed staff benefits other than wages and 
salaries mean was 0.755 with a standard deviation of 0.521 while those which 
disclosed their capital structure reports generated a mean of 0.705 and a α of 
0.5404. 
Analysis of skewness revealed that the average score for ownership 
structure skewness averaged 0.57938 which is not far from zero indicating that 
this is a normal distribution. Kurtosis measurement of constructs is more of 
less equal to 3 meaning that this is a normal distribution with a bell shape 
(mesokurtic).  
Among the list companies at NSE, outside shareholders with 10% or 
more were quite significant at 79.4% while cases where CEO own shares were 
also high at 94.5% this coupled with top five percent shareholding proportion 
standing at 75.6% indicated a strong concentration of shares. According to 
Sheilfer and Vishny  (1997) such investors with large stake has the motivation 
to supervisor management and collect information needed to maximize their 
share value hence the achievement of higher corporate value. Waweru and 
Riro (2013) findings indicated that the composition of the board and the 
structure of ownership had the most impact on corporate performance of the 
NSE listed companies. The conclusion of the study supported the existing 
literature’s general empirical findings that ownership structure has a 
significant and positive impact on corporate value growth. 
 
Corporate Control and firm performance 
The aim of this study is partly to determine significance of corporate 
control on firm performance for companies listed at NSE. This objective was 
examined based on its sub-variables of board structure and composition, board 
diversity, director’s salaries and allowances, transparency, auditing and code 
of conduct. The constructs were examined against the indicators of corporate 
value in an effort to establish their impact. The adequacy of the combined 
impact to support the hypothesis was tested using a number of regressions. 
The firm performance measurement variables of Tobin Q and ROA were 
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applied to establish the relationship. Information obtained from financial 
reports of the NSE listed companies formed the basis of the analysis. The null 
hypotheses of the study are stated below:-  
 
H1a: There is no significant relationship between corporate control and 
ROA for NSE listed companies. 
Hypothesis 1a sought to establish the link between corporate value and 
return on assets and was tested using the equation below  
Y = β0 + β1X 
Where;  
X represent corporate control and Y represents ROA.   
Table 2: Regression Model of Corporate Control against ROA  
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .755a .676 .678 .117935 1.491 
Index; 
a. Constant, Corporate Control   
b. dependent variable: ROA 
 
 
The table above present model’s summary for the relationship between 
corporate controls and ROA. It is evident that effect of corporate control on 
ROA is significant with a regression (R) of 0.755. Therefore corporate control 
explained up to 67.8%, (R2 = .678) of the total variation in return on asset is 
attributed to changes in corporate control. The remaining 35.2% is explained 
by the other variable.  
 
ANOVAa - Corporate Control and ROA 
H1b: There is no significant relationship between CC and Tobin 
Q among the NSE listed companies. 
Hypothesis sought to establish the relationship between the stated 
variables for listed companies at NSE. A regression of corporate control on 
corporate value was done using the equation below. 
Y = β0 + β1X 
Where  
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Table 3: Effect of Corporate Control Index on Tobin’s Q 
Summary of the Model. 




1 .601 .324 .312 .6734401 1.577 
a. Constant, CCI 
b. Dependent Variable: TOBIN Q 
                                         





















a. Dependent Variable: TOBIN Q 
                                                      ANOVA 















  0.471 
112.017 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: TOBIN Q 
b. Predictors: (Constant), CCI 
                                                                  
 
The results show that a weak relationship exists between the two 
variables with regression R of 0.601. The means that only 32.4% (R2 = .324) 
can be explained by corporate control index (CCI) of the Tobin’s Q while the 
balance 67.6% is accounted for by other variables. At p-value greater than 5, 
F value is 112.017 indicating that corporate control index based on Tobin’s Q 
measurement shows a significant influence on company’s returns. Null 
hypothesis is thus rejected. 
In agreement to this, Gompers at al. (2003) who opined that corporate 
governance as calculated by Tobin’s Q had a significant and positive effect on 
firm’s returns.  
 
Moderating Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate value 
Our second aim is to determine the effect of ownership structure on the 
linkage between corporate control and the value of firms listed at the NSE. In 
an effort to establish the relationship, the below hypothesis was formulated in 
null form. 
H2a: There is no significant effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between corporate control and ROA. 
To achieve this objective, effects of the independent variable 
(corporate control) and moderating variable (ownership structure) on the 
dependent variable (corporate value as measured by ROA) and the interaction 
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between corporate control and ownership structure was tested. The 
significance of interaction between corporate control and ownership structure 
is an indicator of the presence of moderation. The Baron and Kenny (1986) 
approach in testing for moderation was employed for the purpose of this study 
guided by the equation: 
Y = β0 + β1X + β3XZ 
Where  
X = Independent variable (corporate control) 
             Z = Moderator (ownership structure) 
             XZ = Product of the standardized scores for the independent variable 
and the moderator. 
            Y = ROA 
A Z score calculated as a product of the difference of data point and 
the mean divided by the standard deviation. It actually shows the number of 
standard deviation from the mean scores and helps locate values in the 
distribution being considered.   
The z –score derived as below: 
Z = X - µ 
         σ  
Z = is the calculated score 
X = is the data value 
To create an interaction term, corporate control and the ownership 
structure was first centred and the two multiplied. A single item indicator 
representing the product of the two measures calculated and transformed into 
Z scores to eliminate possible multicollinearity. The resulting standardized 
variables (corporate control and the ownership structure) was then be 
multiplied to create the interaction variable. See table below:- 
Table 4: The result of regression of the moderating effect of Ownership Structure on 
the relationship between CC and ROA 
 Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corporate control .824(.000) .523(.000) .596(.000) 
Ownership Structure - .302(.018) .254(.027) 
CC * OS - - .087(.006) 
R Square .643 .605 .675 
Adjusted R Square .615 .672 .645 
F Statistics 502.453 246.098 198.564 
Significance .000 .000 .000 
Df1 1 2 3 
Df2 289 288 287 
 
The reading from the above table indicates that corporate control and 
ownership structure explains 67.5% (R2=.675) of the variation in corporate 
value. Statistics change upon combination also shows that R2 change was 
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3.2% i.e. from .643 to .675 (R2 change = 0.032) after the combination of the 
two interaction variables (Ownership structure and corporate control). There 
was a significant statistical change of α = 0.05 (p-value was 0.000). Based on 
this observation, there exists a statistically significant linkage between 
corporate control and ownership structure as confirmed by the F value of 
198.564 and a p-value of 0.000. 
Further analysis shows statistically significant regression coefficients 
for corporate control with a β of 0.824 and a p-value of 0.000. This indicates 
a linear dependence of ROA on corporate control. Ownership structure and 
corporate value relations is also statistically significant when measured by 
ROA of β = 0.302 with a p-value of 0.018. Also, we observed that ROA on 
the combined terms of ownership structure and corporate control was also 
linear at β = 0.87 with a p value=0.006. This indicates that changes in 
ownership structure may positively impact corporate control and corporate 
value given that the direction of the relationship is positive. We therefore 
failed to confirm the hypothesis that there is no significant moderating effect 
of ownership structure on the relationship between corporate control and 
corporate value. 
The study indicates that there is a significant positive moderating effect 
of ownership structure on the relationship between corporate control and firm 
value as calculated by ROA. The result were supported by the finding of  
Bhabra (2007) who studied returns of companies listed at the New Zealand 
securities exchange and found that the relationship were significant and 
positive but not linear. The findings of Stulz (1990), studying management 
owners linkage with company results gave a concave relationship thereby 
partially supported this finding. However, results of Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) relating structure of ownership and corporate returns were not 
significant.  
H2b: There is no significant effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between corporate control and Tobin Q. 
This sub hypothesis tests the impact of corporate control and 
ownership structure on Tobin Q. If the interaction between corporate control 
and ownership structure is significant, moderation is said to have taken place. 
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Table 5: Regression results of moderating effect of ownership structure on the 
relationship between corporate control and corporate value as measured by Tobin Q 
 
The reading of the table revealed that corporate control and ownership 
structure explains 34.5% (R2=.345) of the variation in corporate value. 
Observation of the change statistics from the table shows that R2 increased by 
8.1% from .264 to .354 (R2 change = .081) when the combined effect of 
corporate control and ownership structure was considered. This statistical 
change is not significant at α = 0.05 (P-value =.000). There is therefore an 
insignificant association between ownership structure, company value and 
their interaction as the two models 2&3 shows p-value of .068 and .092 
respectively. 
The reading from the three models show statistically insignificant 
regression coefficients for corporate control of β =.603 with a p-value of .000, 
showing that there is a straight line dependence of Tobin Q and corporate 
control. However, there is a significant association between structure of 
ownership and corporate value as calculated by Tobin’s Q of β = 0.354 with a 
p-value of 0.007. 
The relationship between the structure of ownership and corporate 
value growth has been a topic of ongoing debate from the time of Berle and 
Means (1932). According to the duo, a company with a widely spread out 
owners generally underperform. A number of study findings are in support of 
the findings of this study. The study confirmed the findings of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) that thinly spread ownership tend to increases monitoring and 
supervisory expenses which results in reduced corporate value growth. The 
study was further supported by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) finding that 
when owners hold substantial percentage of shares they tend to take keener 
interest in company management and put pressure on managers to realize 
faster value growth. The relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate value have been confirmed by many other studies (Kang & 
Shivadasani, 1995; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Short, 1994; Gorton & 
Schmidt, 1996 and Thomsen & Pederson, 2000). However, according to the 
 Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corporate control .603(.000) .218(.068) .212(.092) 
Ownership Structure - .354(.007) .305(.006) 
CC * OS - - .192(.000) 
R Square .264 .273 .345 
Adjusted R Square .283 .294 .336 
F Statistics 113.453 62.324 48.934 
Significance .000 .000 .000 
Df1 1 2 3 
Df2 289 288 287 
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argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ownership concentration does not 
significantly affect value creation. 
 
Discussion and Research Findings 
One of our intention was to determine the impact of corporate control 
on the firm value of listed companies at the NSE. This was undertaken by 
analysing the financial statements and other relevant reports of the listed firms. 
The independent variable was examined under different sub constructs, 
namely, board structure and composition, corporate ethics, transparency, 
disclosures and auditing, board diversity and board remuneration. Correlation 
output indicated that linkage between corporate control and firm performance 
of quoted companies is statistically significant. Therefore Hypothesis H1 was 
not confirmed by the study results. Since the results confirmed that corporate 
control strongly influences the firm performance, good corporate controls 
principles and practices are likely to result in high growth in value. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found that the concentration ownership and 
corporate performance have a positive relationship. Gompers at al. (2003) later 
agreed with the findings that relationship between the two is of significant 
value. However, there were other findings which contradicted the study 
finding. A non-positive association between corporate control and company 
value growth was found by Ashbaugh et al. (2004) when they evaluated the 
effect of governance on company’s operational effectiveness in value creation. 
No relationship was recorded by Hermalin and Weisbach (1996) when they 
measured the effect of board mix and corporate growth. Further, Daily and 
Dalton (1992) findings did not show any relationship between corporate 
control and corporate performance even after applying accounts and market 
indicative workings. 
The second objective of the study was to establish the moderating 
effect of ownership structure on the linkage between company control and 
corporate value. The hypothesis that there is no significant moderating effect 
on the linkage between corporate control and corporate value was testing by 
applying Baron and Kenny (1986) approach. The study output showed a 
significant interaction between corporate control, ownership structure and 
corporate value determined by ROA and Tobin Q. The hypothesis that that 
there are no significant influence of corporate control and corporate 
performance as moderated by ownership structure was therefore not 
confirmed. A few of studies have been done linking corporate control or 
governance to firm performance with ownership structure as a moderating 
variables. 
Mediation was further tested by exploring the possibility of a 
mediating effect of ownership structure in the influence of corporate control 
on firm value growth. The output provided sufficient statistical evidence to 
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signify a mediation relationship. The implication of this is that the ownership 
structure, corporate control and corporate value do have a direct relationship, 
and that the interaction of ownership structure and corporate control increases 
the influence on firm returns. 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) found foreign board membership had a 
positive influence on corporate value growth. The same was supported by 
others studies (Baek et al., 2004 & Park, 2004) findings of significant linkage 
between foreign ownership and company value improvement. Although a 
number of studies are in support of the finding of this study and have found a 
significant and positive relationship of concentrated ownership on corporate 
performance (Mitton, 2002 & Joh, 2003. Sanchez and Garcia, (2009) found a 
non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. Dalton et al., (2003) and Sanchez and Garcia, (2009) findings 
indicated a concave association concerning ownership structure and corporate 
value. A number of papers have provided comprehensive survey and found 
that on impact of concentration factor in ownership are mixed (Gugler, 2001; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 and Short, 1994). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the study test results has underscored the weight given 
to corporate control in enabling firms to achieve consistent high value. The 
ownership structure plays a key part in influencing the linkage concerning 
corporate control and corporate value growth and should play a key role in 
adopting good governance principle to achieve enhanced performance. The 
study has shown that agency problems can be aggravated by high voting rights 
which may result in pyramid ownership structures and crossholding. The 
resulting situation results in over-reliance on debt resulting from main 
shareholders desire to preserve their shareholding from dilution. This is the 
phenomenon which Claessens et al. (2002) referred to as non-dilution 
entrenchment. The study findings were in line with the observation that 
proprietorship centeredness improves company control and hence value 
creation as it reduces agency cost. A positive association concerning 
ownership concentration and company growth were also found by other 
studies (Margaritis & Psilaki, 2010 and Himmelberg et al., 1999). Other than 
high proportion of shares per owner, identity or mix of ownership is important 
in understanding variation in company’s effectiveness in value creation. Here 
foreign and State shareholdings were examined. The findings indicates that 
depending on the appropriateness of board structure, ownership structure and 
corporate financial policies have potential mechanisms to control for agency 
problem arising from dispersed ownership. Similar findings were noted by 
Jensen, 1986. 
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The results show the importance of corporate control for growth of 
company value and shareholders’ equity. It was found that large board size 
increases corporate value as they have a large number of expertise for better 
decision making, making it more difficult for CEO to manipulate. In addition 
to satisfying the regulatory requirement, the board also plays a crucial role in 
addressing company problems. Our findings indicated that smaller size of 
board helps improve corporate performance and value through efficient use of 
resources. It was noted that when payment is linked to performance, it act as 
an incentive for improve performance and greater effort and also to reduce the 
effect of agency problem thereby positively affecting firm value. It was also 
evident that corporate control can be enhanced by increasing accountability 
and promoting sustainable wealth creation.  
The study therefore concludes that the central appreciative in the arena 
of corporate control has its basis on the fact that there is a potential problem 
originating from the parting of ownership and control which has been 
necessitated by the growth in size and complexities of corporation. The results 
were in line with this understanding and showed existence of significant and 
positive link concerning corporate control and firm value. The conclusion is 
supported by previous research findings (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The 
results show the importance of corporate control for growth of firm 
performance and shareholders’ equity. We have also seen that ownership 
structure moderation in the relationship of corporate control and firm value is 
valuable to the company performance.  Each of the two variables (corporate 
control and capital structure) had significant joint contribution to the corporate 
value as determined by Return on company resources and Tobin Q. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
The study has contributed to the existing knowledge by providing 
empirical evidence that the structure of ownership has a moderating effect on 
corporate control and corporate value growth. The study has also combined 
important mechanism in CCI and OSI to establish the effect of corporate 
control and ownership structure on corporate value growth which has provided 
new insight and increase the number of variables and sub variables thereby 
enriching the result. The study will be invaluable to future researcher as it 
provide a rich base on knowledge on which to build future research. The study 
therefore contributes to theory, methodology as well as practice. 
 
Limitation of the Study 
Under ownership, we considered only ownership concentration, 
foreign ownership and state ownership while others like domestic ownership, 
institutional ownership, and corporate ownership among others could also 
have some effect. The secondly the scope of the study was only limited to 
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those companies listed in Nairobi stock exchange within the last five years 
which may make the study not be generally applicable to other developing 
countries in Africa and beyond as well as developed countries. 
The above limitations do not dilute the value of the findings. Its 
findings has a far reaching input to corporate world, researchers and general 
understanding touching on areas of corporate control and governance which 
still has a lot of room for future studies. 
 
Recommendation and Policy Implication 
The study reveals the importance played by the government and other 
regulatory authorities in issuing a number of regulations and policies to 
continually strengthen corporate control and ensure stable and increasing 
corporate performance. Since individual firm’s performance is intrinsically 
linked to the entire country’s economic well-being, the authorities are able to 
guide, improve and increase economic growth through these regulations and 
policies. This also help in ensuring that board members and company leaders 
has required qualification and experience as well as the necessary competency 
to drive growth and reduce conflict of interest.  
 
Suggestion for Future Research 
Future researchers need to incorporate other performance measures, 
both financial and non-financial other than just ROA and Tobin Q considered 
above for measuring firm value. For measurement of ownership structure, they 
may consider also block investors, directors’ ownership, and government 
ownership among others. Corporate control can also include such variables as 
corporate social responsibility, family board members among others. 
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